

Democracy for Europe To Be Problem Facing Anglo-U.S.-Soviet Talks

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Washington, Sept. 30.—While Britons and Americans tend to regard the Russian problem, soon to be discussed by the three Foreign Ministers, as part of the task of three-power agreement in the interest of world peace, the European view, as reflected in diplomatic and informed American circles here, is that it poses the issue who is to dominate Europe after the defeat of Germany.

This view, as expressed in similar terms by experts of various nationalities, is in substance as follows:

Europe, which has been to some extent overlooked in the discussions of the three great non-European powers whose representatives are about to meet, seems likely to face the alternative of an easterly or westerly orientation—of linking up with Moscow or with an Anglo-American Entente, however informal. The present negotiations between Washington and London on the one hand and Moscow on the other may determine which alternative may be imposed, regardless of their will, upon the European States.

For twenty years, as one diplomat put it, Europe has been flooded by Fascist and Communist propaganda to the effect that the democracies were feeble and decadent, and the foreign policies of the democracies in the prewar years did not confute this thesis. The appearance of American soldiers on European soil will tend to confute it and will revive Europeans' faith in the democracies and in democracy, but only if behind those troops is a policy which offers Europe some hope of democratic revival—that is, of a western orientation that can succeed.

The United States, these observers believe, cannot permanently condone or support a Europe divided into spheres of influence, but they

conclude that this will happen unless there is a British-American policy to prevent it.

Some Europeans are shocked and frightened by the assumption, often heard here and in London, that Russia is fated to dominate Europe and that Britain and the United States must resign themselves to that prospect and seek a rapprochement with her accordingly. The Scandinavians, the Poles, even the Yugoslavs, in spite of their affinity with Russia, inquire anxiously whether this is to be our policy.

"We can find the road to Moscow if we must," said one European expert, "but we would like to know whether we must."

These observers recall that France and Britain were never fully united, that they were further divided by the collapse of France, and that there now has developed a chilliness, to say the least, between the United States and the French leaders in Algiers, who form the nearest thing today to a French State. Yet they believe that France must play a vital role in the European picture, and that logically she should be the strongest single national force in favor of a westerly orientation.

They note meanwhile that Premier Stalin has sent to Algiers as his representative, and as the Russian member of the new Mediterranean Commission, A. A. Vyshinsky, former Vice-Commissar of Foreign Affairs and the prosecutor in the famous trials of 1936 to 1938—which is much as though the United States sent the Undersecretary of State. This is taken in all quarters here to indicate the importance that Mr. Stalin attaches to France and to Russian connections with France after the war.

This naturally is related in Europeans' minds with the whole picture of the continent, which they fear may become a series of spheres of influence, with Moscow's being the greatest, at least in Eastern and Central Europe.

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